frozen credit markets, busted commercial-paper markets, attacks on investment banks and huge redemptions, all of that on this past Wednesday:
From Today's WSJ:
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Bracing for Redemptions
Fed staff discovered that one reason the federal-funds rate was behaving so abnormally was because money-market funds were building up cash in preparation for redemptions, leaving hoards of cash at their banks that the banks wouldn't invest.
U.S. depositary institutions on average held excess reserves of $90 billion each day this week, estimates Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP. This is cash the banks hold on the sidelines that does not earn any interest. That compares with an average of $2 billion, he says, noting he estimates banks held $190 billion in excess cash on Thursday, as they feared they'd have to meet many obligations at the same time.
Through Wednesday, money-market fund investors -- including institutional investors such as corporate treasurers, pension funds and sovereign wealth funds -- pulled out a record $144.5 billion, according to AMG Data Services. The industry had $7.1 billion in redemptions the week before.
Without these funds' participation, the $1.7 trillion commercial-paper market, which finances automakers' lending arms or banks credit-card units, faced higher costs. The commercial-paper market shrank by $52.1 billion in the week ended Wednesday, according to data from the Federal Reserve, the largest weekly decline since December.
Without commercial paper, "factories would have to shut down, people would lose their jobs and there would be an effect on the real economy," says Paul Schott Stevens, president of the Investment Company Institute mutual-fund trade group.
Officials also watched as the market for mortgage-backed securities disappeared. The government's seizure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they had hoped, would reinstill confidence in this market. But yields on mortgage-backed bonds were rising as trading evaporated, nearing levels reached before the government's takeover, which would likely translate into higher mortgage rates for consumers. Borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages, meanwhile, were in trouble: The cost of many such loans is based on Libor, or the London interbank offered rate, which had soared as banks stopped lending to one another.
On Wednesday in Mr. Paulson's office, with its photographs of birds and other wildlife taken during family trips, top advisers stayed close at hand. Watching market quotes, they participated in an ongoing conference call via speakerphone with the Federal Reserve and New York Fed.
Root of the Problem
Mr. Paulson wanted Congress to bless a plan that would allow Treasury to create a new facility to hold auctions and buy up distressed assets from financial institutions headquartered in the U.S. Without Congressional approval, Treasury could expand programs to buy mortgage-backed securities through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but that wouldn't be enough to address the broadening problems.
The Fed, meanwhile, was supposed to be a lender of last resort to banks. It wasn't built to fix all these problems, and the snowballing crisis worried Fed officials.
"This financial episode is one where a huge part of the problem is outside of the banking system," said Frederic Mishkin, a Columbia University professor who recently left the Federal Reserve as a governor. "We're in a whole new ball game."
On Thursday, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke decided to ask Congress for authority to buy up hundreds of billions of dollars of assets. In the afternoon, Mr. Paulson, Mr. Bernanke and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox briefed President Bush for 45 minutes.
Mr. Paulson told Mr. Bush that markets were frozen and many different types of assets had become illiquid, or untradeable. Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke told the president that the situation was "extraordinarily serious," according to a senior administration official.
"We need to do what it takes to solve this problem," Mr. Bush replied.
That evening, during the meeting with Congressional leaders, Mr. Bernanke gave a "chilling" description of current conditions, according to one person present. He described the frozen credit markets, busted commercial-paper markets and attacks on investment banks. The financial condition of some major institutions was "uncertain," he said.
'Uncertain Fate'
"If we don't do this, we risk an uncertain fate," Mr. Bernanke added. He said that if the problem wasn't corrected, the U.S. economy could enter a deep, multi-year recession akin to Japan's lost decade of the 1990s, or what Sweden endured in the early 1990s when a surge in bad loans plagued the economy and sent unemployment to 12%.
One lawmaker asked whether the solution will prevent bank failures. Mr. Paulson said it will stabilize markets. "But we'll still see banks fail in the normal course," he said.
On Friday, Mr. Paulson announced plans for a sweeping program to take over troubled mortgage assets. "The federal government must implement a program to remove these illiquid assets that are weighing down our financial institutions and threatening our economy," he said at a press conference. He said he would work with Congress over the weekend to get legislation in place next week.
During a round of briefings on Friday, Messrs. Bernanke and Paulson chilled lawmakers with their dire warnings about the cost of inaction. They had already taken additional steps, including new measures to unfreeze money-market mutual funds and an SEC plan to temporarily ban short-selling.
Speaking that afternoon, House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat, tagged the rescue of AIG as the tipping point. "It didn't have the broader calming effect," Rep. Frank said. "They tried it the free-market way, they tried it the big intervention way -- and the result was on Wednesday, the world was falling in on everybody's ears."
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